In our model, two profit-maximizing sellers sell a homogeneous good to Bayesian, riskneutral buyers in an online comparison shopping service. Buyers use a reputation system to update their beliefs about sellers. Buyers purchase from the seller that maximizes the buyer's expected utility from the purchase. We find that the seller's profit depends on the distribution of buyer beliefs. A degenerate distribution of beliefs implies either Bertrand competition or a monopolistic market. A non-degenerate distribution implies that both sellers can be profitable, if their reputations differ from each other. The seller with a higher reputation score receives a greater profit. If sellers are similar in every respect, the Bertrand equilibrium obtains. We test the theory with data from Pricegrabber using OLS and quantile regression. Controlling for different seller types, the evidence indicates that higher reputation scores may support price premiums.
Introduction
The ease of comparing prices and product offerings increases efficiency in electronic markets. Designed for this purpose, comparison shopping services are electronic marketplaces that lower buyer search costs by gathering and distributing information about sellers 1 . The buyer that wishes to purchase some product uses the search engine of a comparison shopping website to receive a list of price quotes from the sellers that offer the desired product. As a result, the buyer can choose the most preferable offer from the available sellers in terms of price, delivery, payment and the seller's quality.
In the economic literature, comparison shopping services relate to information clearinghouse models. In Varian (1980) , a fraction of buyers use the information clearinghouse, such as a newspaper, to locate the seller who sets the lowest price, whereas other buyers are evenly distributed among all sellers. As a result, buyer heterogeneity produces price dispersion. Baye and Morgan (2001) take information clearinghouse models to electronic markets. They suggest that an optimizing monopolistic operator of a comparison shopping service sets its fees for sellers high enough to induce some sellers to stay out of the service. In contrast, the fees for buyers are low enough to encourage full participation. In consequence, the prices are lower in the comparison shopping service than in the outside market, which encourages buyers to use the service. From the buyer's perspective, comparison shopping markets may provide considerable increase in consumer surplus because it mitigates the buyer's information costs and spurs competition among sellers. From the seller's perspective, they could lead to cut-throat price competition, because there is little room for product differentiation and free entry erases supernormal profits.
Despite the challenging market environment, empirical evidence shows that well-known e-commerce giants as well as less-known small firms participate in comparison shopping markets (Saastamoinen, 2008) . Since the operators of comparison shopping websites 1 often charge fees from the participating vendors, benefits from participation must exceed its costs for sellers. For a small firm, a comparison shopping market could bring visibility at low costs (Wan, 2006) . Visibility is vital because buyers are aware of only a fraction of sellers in the market (Grover et al., 2006) . To attract unaware buyers to their online stores, sellers have to advertise or organize promotional alliances with search engines (Latcovich & Howard, 2001; Filson, 2004) . On the other hand, a firm must pursue an aggressive pricing strategy which restrains profitability. While incentives to participate in comparison shopping services are not obvious, some benefits from participation may exist. First, firms may organize periodical sales or inventory clear outs and occasionally win the bidding contest as suggested by Varian (1980) . Second, as more buyers learn to use the search mechanisms of the Internet for commercial purposes, it is harder to maintain prices above the competitive level. Third, it gives an opportunity to monitor prices or issue a commitment to certain price level. Smith (2001) entertains a possibility that dominant sellers could use a comparison shopping service in collusion to maintain higher prices.
Price alone cannot explain competition in comparison shopping markets because the problems of asymmetric information and moral hazard are inherent in e-markets. The lack of direct contact between buyers and sellers raises concerns about opportunistic fraudulent behavior . In markets of perfect and complete information, every action an agent takes and the agent's action history is observable to other agents rendering reputation irrelevant in such markets. Asymmetric information creates incentives to reputation building. Cabral (2005) defines reputation as "the situation when agents believe a particular agent to be something." This belief may be crucial for commercial transactions to take place. For this reason, seller reputations may play a large role in competition. To address this problem, many e-commerce marketplaces have introduced reputation systems which gather and distribute aggregated information from buyers about the past behavior of sellers (Resnick et al., 2000) .
As the online business environment cultivates concerns over the trustworthiness of a trading partner, this may impede market entry because buyers trust the established firms 2 more than newcomers. Economic benefits of reputation building may explain the proliferation of reputation systems. First, reputation can be viewed as an asset. In Klein and Leffler (1981) and Shapiro (1983) , a firm invests in reputation by selling high quality products at loss initially but earning a price premium on the established reputation later.
To be qualified as an asset implies that established reputations can be bought. As a result, Mailath and Samuelson (2001) show that a reputation may not be a good signal of quality because incompetent firms buy good reputations. Second, Klein and Leffler (1981) suggest that consumers view reputation as a protection for contractual obligation. A price premium from reputation induces a firm to maintain good quality because the profit stream from good quality products exceeds the gains from cheating. Hörner (2002) argues that this does not provide sufficient incentives to maintain good quality. Instead, competition provides such incentives by creating an outside option to buyers who can patronize the seller's rival, if they detect cheating on behalf of the seller.
The comparison shopping services with reputation systems may provide simultaneously a low-cost entry point to the market as well as insulation from price competition. Zhou (et al. 2008 ) present a model for online markets, in which they show that a reputation system can reduce asymmetric information in an online market and replicate the results of Shapiro (1983) . An efficient reputation system provides incentives to fulfill contractual obligations. There must also be incentives to participate and report truthful feedback through the reputation system. Bakos and Dellarocas (2003) show that an online reputation system can be more efficient in enforcing desired behavior than a threat of litigation process.
In this paper, we present a theoretical model of interactions between buyers and sellers in a comparison shopping service with an integrated reputation system, and derive implications for competition. In addition, we test the model with empirical data from Pricegrabber, which is a popular online comparison shopping service. The paper proceeds as follows. In the second section, we present the theoretical model. In the third section, we test the model with least-squares regression (OLS) and quantile regression (QR). In the final section, we conclude the paper.
Model of Competition in Online Comparison Shopping Services

Buyers
Consider an electronic marketplace for a homogeneous good. (Smith and Brynjolfsson, 2001) . A fundamental distinction between types of goods was proposed by Nelson (1970) who categorizes them into search goods and experience goods. Price and/or quality comparisons precede consumption of search goods, whereas experience goods have to be consumed before their quality can be ascertained. As delivery often places a significant lag between purchase and consumption of a good, the entire transaction process could be considered as a good that has the characteristics of both good types. Comparison shopping services provide easy access to price information. However, the uncertainty over the overall purchase experience raises concerns about the seller's trustworthiness.
The quality of a transaction with the seller is discernible to the buyer after the transaction has been concluded. For simplicity, the buyer rates the transaction as a success or a failure. Therefore, the reputation system is similar to the binary system presented in Dellarocas (2004) . In consequence, the feedback takes two values: "good" (G) for a successful transaction and "bad" (B) for a failure 3 . As the tth buyer elicits feedback on the seller, the reputation system updates the seller's feedback profile by adding 
Consequently, the likelihood that the seller is bad is
In any given period, a seller's public feedback profile, which is visible to all subsequent buyers and rival sellers, shows the likelihood that the seller is good ( t γ ) and the number of reviews the seller has received (t). The public feedback profile is a crude measure for a seller's reputation when t is small, but its precision increases as a more feedback is being accumulated. A consistent feedback profile could provide the same proof as repeat purchases to quality-conscious on the seller's commitment to maintain high quality service (Rao and Bergen, 1992) . While switching one's identity easy on the Internet, a large value of t signals the seller's commitment to stay in the market under the same guise. As reputation building is a gradual, time-consuming process, a long market history implies greater costs of an identity switch to the seller.
If the seller's type is unknown to the buyer before a transaction, the buyer must assess the seller's trustworthiness from the available information. Each buyer has a private signal
(prior probability) on the seller's type. The seller's reputation can be interpreted as a buyer's belief of the seller's true type (Cabral, 2005) . It is easy to imagine numerous factors that could contribute toθ . For example, previous transactions with the seller could completely override the public information (Smith and Brynjolfsson, 2001 ). The buyer assigns 1 = θ (extremely favorable) or 0 = θ (extremely unfavorable) depending on her previous experience 4 . New buyers may have lower values for θ in general, whereas experienced buyers are more trustful on sellers (or vice versa). Allowing for herd behavior, the buyer could also take cue from her immediate predecessor's opinion by setting a low or high value for θ to conform to the predecessors' reviews. In addition, a price may signal the seller's type (Doyle, 1990; Tirole, 1994) . For now, we only assume that θ is distributed according to some distribution with density
. Priors for all sellers are drawn from this distribution.
Infrequent purchases and a constant influx of new buyers into the market make the forming of seller reputations (Tirole, 1994) . For this reason, an important piece of information is the public feedback profile provided by the previous buyers. This is an electronic counterpart to the word-of-mouth in the physical world (Resnick et al., 2000) .
We assume that the only communication mechanism between buyers is a reputation system, so other buyers' private signals are only observable through their feedback.
Moreover, a seller cannot be a buyer which prevents manipulation of sellers' reputations.
Buyers use the Bayes' rule to obtain the posterior probability ) , 6 subsequent buyers benefit from the feedback given by their predecessors. In general, a buyer updates the posterior probability t i,
Notice that if no transaction takes place, the next buyer has only the first buyer's feedback at disposal. For this reason, the length of a ratings history may also provide important information about the seller's quality.
Suppose that buyers in the market are risk-neutral. They have identical valuations ( w ) for the homogeneous good. Let k denote the cost of an unsuccessful transaction, and .
Given the posterior probability the buyer's expected value V of the good is
Equation (3) can be simplified by dividing it with w, so the value of the good to the buyer is 1. To simplify the analysis, assume that 0 = k . This could be interpreted as the third party, such as a credit card company, bearing the cost of misdemeanor, or the good being low in value. Let w V v = . As a result, Equation (3) simplifies to
The value of the good to the buyer depends only on the buyer's posterior probability that the seller's type is good. This is the buyer's reservation price for the good that is purchased from the specific seller.
Buyers seek to maximize their (expected) utility ( u )
where is the set of prices. The utility is increasing in ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ p µ and decreasing in p.
Clearly, transactions take place only if p ≥ µ . Moreover, Equation (5) implies that riskneutral buyers buy from the seller that guarantees them the highest (expected) surplus.
Since µ implies that buyers also care about the level of service, we assume that there exists a price that buyers consider too low for a seller to provide sufficient service. We assume that this price is common knowledge. This sets a lower bound to the set of possible prices. Any price below the lower bound signals with certainty that the seller's type is bad. Klein and Leffler (1981) show that consumers can use price to judge the quality of a firm's products. Their model suggests that consumers are able to distinguish the situations in which the price is too low to produce quality products.
Sellers
Sellers are retailers in a vertical market structure. The good is produced by an upstream manufacturer. The upstream market is competitive and thus, the manufacturer's price (the wholesale price) equals to the manufacturer's marginal cost. Sellers maximize their profit in the downstream market. There is no vertical integration between the upstream manufacturer and downstream retailers. Since the upstream market is competitive, the linear pricing contract in the vertical market structure is admissible and sellers take as given (Tirole, 1994) . seller's rivals profits or the payoffs accruing to buyers, or both (Doyle, 1990) . First, the seller selects a retail price p. The choice is effectively constrained by the monopolist from below and the buyers' maximum willingness to pay ( µ ) from above. 
where
is the fraction of buyers the seller receives (we define this measure later).
There is a mass of buyers normalized to one in the market in each period. This assumption allows us to split the market between sellers if a buyer cohort receives an equal surplus from both of them.
The level of effort has an indirect impact on a seller's reputation. The probability of a successful transaction is increasing in the level of effort. For this reason, even good sellers occasionally disappoint buyers, but the seller's reputation score is a good approximation of the level of effort the seller has chosen in the past. By taking high effort, the seller increases the probability that the buyer has a positive experience with the seller and the resulting feedback is positive.
Market
For simplicity, Suppose that there are two sellers in the marketplace, Seller h and Seller l.
In any period, a competitive price cannot be equal to the wholesale price . If a seller sets its price equal to the wholesale price, it signals to the buyer that the seller chooses zero effort. The buyer concludes that the seller must be a bad seller and assigns this and conclude that the seller is bad and assign 0 = θ . As a result, the market unravels due to asymmetric information in the one-period game.
Obviously, a market exists as long as buyers believe that good sellers that are committed to stay in the market with some positive probability exist. A multi-period game requires a device that signals the seller's commitment to quality to buyers. Dellarocas (2004) shows that a binary reputation system provides sufficient incentives for a seller to maintain good quality. In his model, cooperating sellers and cheating sellers both produce good quality and bad quality with positive probabilities. As a result, even good sellers, though not as 5 A duopoly model can be easily expanded to comprise more sellers. frequently as bad sellers, produce occasionally bad quality which is reported to buyers by the reputation system. Corresponding to their reputation profiles, sellers adjust their prices to maximize profit. We assume that sellers find it worthwhile to induce effort, which is reflected by their reputation profiles. Second, if the sellers are identical, which occurs when
, the Bertrand equilibrium obtains. This could be a stable equilibrium. Suppose that a seller is tempted to select , "to cheat", because this could result in a short run profit provided that buyers do not detect cheating. Still, the seller cannot charge a higher price after a successful deviation because it shares 0 = e γ with its rival. However, the probability that buyers detect cheating increases with 0 = e . If the seller is caught cheating and the rival does not cheat, this gives the upper hand to the competitor with every period forward because its reputation score is higher. As a consequence, the cheating seller can be driven out of the market.
A non-degenerate distribution of private signals implies heterogeneity in buyer beliefs. 
are the prices that solve the profit maximization problems, may yield higher profits for both sellers. Equation (9) states that Seller h may ignore the most optimistic buyers with and set prices high enough to sell the good to the buyers whose beliefs are drawn from
. In essence, Seller h extracts surplus from the more distrustful buyers. As buyers maximize surplus, the most optimistic buyers purchase from Seller l which has to sell the good at a strictly lower price than Seller h.
Since sellers know each other's reputation profiles and the updating mechanism of buyers, they can compute the lower bound for priors that yield a non-negative surplus to buyers. For example, with a choice of price and the given reputation profile
γ , the lower bound for the priors that yield non-negative surplus to buyers is
We denote the absolute lower bound by ) ( p θ which is the prior that induces a buyer to buy with the lowest possible price. The lower bound is increasing in p and decreasing in γ . In consequence, the minimum profit of Seller h is on the interval ] , [ l h θ θ because Seller l cannot set any lower price that could expand its market. Thus, by raising the price a seller loses customers among the more pessimistic buyers but this increases revenue from the more optimistic buyers. Lowering the price attracts more customers from both ends of the buyer distribution but decreases the overall revenue per customer. As a result, the seller selects that maximizes its profit. This may preclude some pessimistic buyers from the market because the decrease in the revenue per customer may more than offset the additional revenue from the increased market size.
* p
The upper bound for Seller h is obtained by solving for θ in equation
13 which sets the surpluses equal between the two sellers. We assume that the seller with a better reputation receives buyers that are indifferent between the two sellers. Let 
The optimal prices depend on the distribution of buyer beliefs and the seller's reputation. Since reputation scores are public knowledge, both can use Equation (2) to compute reservation price paths for the known or expected distribution of buyer beliefs. Using Equation (5), sellers can experiment with prices that maximize their profits. If buyers place value on seller reputations, both firms may be able to sell their products in the market with supernormal profit and without collusion. Consequently, price dispersion may result from this because reputation provides pricing power. Since even good sellers receive bad reviews occasionally, prices may fluctuate as sellers adjust their prices to maximize profits in their reputation profiles.
The model explicitly shows that the distribution of buyers' private signals impacts sellers' profits. One could conjecture that new buyers might have lower priors which benefits more reputable sellers. As long as e-markets grow in size, which means that the share of new buyers in the market is steady or increasing, maintaining a good reputation is a profitable strategy. This offers rationale for well-known vendors to have presence in highly competitive comparison shopping services because their existing reputations may provide opportunities for premium pricing. However, a shift in distribution towards higher priors, which could happen when buyers become more experienced, may diminish the value of a good reputation in favor of more aggressive price competition. Moreover, this model offers an explanation for the observed price dispersion in online markets, which has been a finding in numerous studies (e.g. Brynjolfsson and Bakos (2000) ; Ancarani and Shankar (2004) ; Leiter and Warin (2007) ).
Empirical Analysis
We test the theory of competition with reputations in a comparison shopping service with the data from two-seller markets listed in Pricegrabber, which is one of the most popular comparison shopping websites 8 . We use a portion of the data that was analyzed in Saastamoinen (2008) . The sample data was obtained from Pricegrabber in May 2008. It consists of prices for various goods ranging from consumer electronics to auto parts.
Pricegrabber has a reputation system which provides rating scores for each seller. A 8 For more details about the website, see www.pricegrabber.com.
rating score, which ranges from 1 (the lowest) to 5 (the highest), is aggregated from buyer feedback. We approximate seller reputations with the rating scores.
To test the theory, it is important to control for different seller types. One way is to use the two seller packages offered by Pricegrabber as a controlling device. A merchant runs its own e-commerce websites and pays a click-through rate to Pricegrabber for buyers that are redirected to the merchant's website by Pricegrabber. A storefront pays a commission to Pricegrabber for each commercial transaction, but it does not run an own e-commerce website. Consequently, storefronts rely on the comparison shopping service as their only sales channel, while merchants use the service to lure in price-conscious buyers. Small sellers are likely to select the storefront package, whereas other sellers opt for the merchant package. The dummy variable SF denotes storefronts. In addition, we use the Internet Retailer's list of the largest e-commerce retailers to control for the largest sellers 9 . These are large companies whose brands may provide them some insulation from price competition in e-markets, because buyers view brands as a proxy for reliability (Smith, 2002) . The dummy variable TOP500 denotes large e-commerce vendors.
As the sample consist of two-seller markets, we calculate the difference in prices as ,
in which ( ) is the maximum (minimum) price observed in the market k. Since , it follows that .
Due to diversity of product categories in the sample, product values vary considerably.
For this reason, the pecuniary value of price differences may naturally be greater in expensive products than in relatively low priced products. To make price differences 
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We calculate also a difference between reputation scores. This is
in which ( ) is the reputation score of the seller that sets the maximum (minimum) price observed in the market k. Taking a logarithmic transformation also from provides a straightforward interpretation of regression coefficients as elasticities.
The logarithmic transformation of requires scaling of . This is done by Table 1 . They indicate that the mean (median) of price differences is greater in markets where storefronts and Top500-sellers operate, whereas the range of price differences is greater in all markets. In contrast, the mean (median) of differences in rating scores is higher in all the sample than in either control group. Storefronts and Top500-sellers did not overlap each other in this sample.
Altogether, the control groups account for 15 per cent of the markets. We devise a log-linear regression model to test the theory. 
The results from OLS-regression with White Heteroskedasticity Consistent Estimates (HSCE) are reported in Table 2 . Excluding the dummy variables for the controlled groups, all estimates prove statistically significant. OLS estimates for the regression constant and dummy constants indicate that the difference between prices is higher in markets where storefronts and Top500-sellers are active than in all markets. The impact of an increase in the difference between rating scores varies. The general effect is negative (-0.815) . This implies that a one per cent increase in the difference between rating scores decreases the difference between prices by -0.8 per cent. In contrast, the control groups display a positive dependency. Together with , the estimates for storefronts (1.931) correspond to 1.1 per cent increase in the price difference.
overshadows the positive coefficient of Top500-sellers (0.655) yielding a mild decrease of -0.2 per cent when the difference between rating scores increases by a one per cent.
Hence, the evidence suggests that reputation has an impact on a seller's pricing especially in the markets where storefronts are active. The histogram of OLS residuals and the Jarque-Bera test for normality in Figure 1 indicate the distribution of residuals is not normal. Since the value of a good may be important in consumer's decision-making, we test the robustness of the results with quantile regression (QR). QR provides information about how changes in covariates impact in different points of the distribution of the response variable. Estimates are obtained for 0.25, 0.5 and 0.75 quantiles. The results of quantile process are presented in Table 3 . QR estimates for 0.5 quantile corresponds to the median, which is a semiparametric alternative to OLS. Therefore, it is interesting to see that the estimates for 0.5 quantile do not agree with OLS. The intercept decreases in magnitude to 0.155. Also, the dummy for Top500-sellers becomes positive and statistically significant at 2.246. All estimates for storefronts are statistically insignificant. The estimates for all markets is -0.085 and for Top500-sellers -0.793. These correspond to -0.1 per cent and -0.9 per cent decreases in the difference between prices when the difference between ratings increases by a one percent. Thus, the median regression does not provide empirical evidence for the test hypothesis. implies potential for a greater financial loss to the buyer. Therefore, a seller whose reputation score is higher than its rival may charge higher prices in a market of zero search costs for price information. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we present a model of duopoly competition for a comparison shopping service which has an integrated reputation system. Electronic marketplaces that provide comparison shopping services have become widespread in retail e-commerce. These services reduce buyer's search costs by providing price quotes from several sellers for the buyer's benefit. Since buyers may feel that risks of an e-commerce transaction are greater than in a conventional commercial transaction, e-marketplaces have introduced reputation systems to reduce the risks of asymmetric information.
We assume Bayesian buyers with heterogeneous beliefs about seller types. Buyers use the reputation system to update their beliefs about seller types. A profit-maximizing seller takes into account buyer beliefs, its rating score and its rival's reputation score in its pricing decision. We find that sellers may earn supernormal profits as returns to their 22 reputations. The seller that has a better reputation earns higher profit than its rival. If sellers are identical, competition erases supernormal profits. Since even good sellers occasionally disappoint buyers, sellers adjust their prices to maximize profits in their current reputation profiles. For this reason, market prices are likely to fluctuate and price dispersion emerges.
We test the theory with the price and rating score data from Pricegrabber, which is a popular comparison shopping website. We find evidence that there is a positive dependency between prices and reputation scores. This is especially evident among sellers whose only sales channel is the comparison shopping service. Moreover, wellknown e-commerce sellers may be able to leverage their existing reputations and charge price premiums. Quantile regression reveals that this may be especially true among more valuable goods where the buyer's pecuniary risks are higher.
In conclusion, this paper proposes a theory and evidence why a good reputation could be a valuable asset in e-commerce. For this reason, a seller may find it profitable to keep consumer satisfaction at a high level at least initially to gain competitive advantage later.
As a direction for future research, it would be interesting to find out, how much weight consumers actually place on sellers' reputation profiles in their purchase decisions. Also, a detailed view of which actions taken by the seller increase consumer satisfaction and lead to higher rating scores would provide valuable information to e-commerce vendors.
